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]EL 96-0835 This is an interesting, provocative chronology of oil market activity over the last three decades, including all the major and minor events. Adelman, the best known oil market economist over this period, weaves together his own interpretation with numerous quotes from contelnporaneous coverage in the New York Times, the \Val1 St. Journal, and the trade press. The perspective is from within the oil market, with a focus on the supply side. There is virtually no mention of the larger, external events that most other analysts believe to have impacted the oil inarket and condi-tioned the actions of the major producer countries. The 1973 war between Israel and its neighbors is described as follows, in its entirety: Most of the chronology is fairly straightforward, and the economic analysis is excellent, if not always persuasive as the only possible exvlanation of OPEC members' decisions. But least convincing is Adelman's view that oil was in surplus in 1970, and that the rapidly growing reliance on OPEC oil, which nreceded the 1973 oil shock, need not even have been slowed, much less reversed. In contrast, many other analysts have argued that the extraordinarily rapid growth in the demand for OPEC oil output, ten percent annually in the decade preceding the 1973 oil shock, was unsustainable, even with OPEC's large oil reserves (Gately 1984 (Gately , 1989 . A substantial price increase would have been necessary in the 1970s even without the existence of OPEC, in order to slow the surging market share of OPEC in world oil and world energy. As MacAvoy (1982, pp. 52-57) has written, "there was no avoiding the substantial price increases necessary to clear the inarket of annual increases in crude oil demand." Without such a shift toward alternative sources of oil and energy, the world would have become much more dependent upon Persian Gulf oil than it was in 1973, and even inore vulnerable to oil supply disruptions, either accidental or intentional.
The analysis of the first oil price shock and the effective cartelization of the inarket in 1973-74-and how we could have gotten there so quickly from an alleged oil sur$us in 1970--is especially weak. It has the flavor and aroma of the 1950s search in Washington for "Who lost China?" A State Department villain is identified, James Akins, whose fingerprints are found at Inany key events. Adelman ar-, ,
gues that oil price quadrupling might not have occurred, had Akins and others not suggested to OPEC how dependent was the West on OPEC exports, how damaging would be oil price increases, and thus how willing would be the West to pay higher prices. But we prefer the view of Greenberger:
One may wish that certain representatives of government or certain institutions had acted differently at critical points in a crisis, but that does not mean that they created the crisis or that they had the power to avert it. (1983, p p 21-22)
The sole reliance on econoinic models of OPEC members' decisions is ultimately not sufficient. Surely, decisions made by Saudi Arabia are not purely economic, especially at tiines of crisis such as October 1973 or Januarv 1980. Thev had substantial latitude in their decisions, and were not simply short term revenue maximizers. A more complex picture of the conflicts involved in the Saudi decision to cut its production in January 1980, at the height of the Iranian disruption, is described by Moran (1982) .
Despite these shortcomings, this is an im~o r t a n t book and a inost valuable resource about oil market activity in oil's most tumultuous period.
DERMOT G~T E L Y Every policy oriented economist has had the experience of wanting to scream at the quality of analysis in econoinics reporting in the popular press. Environlnental policy issues seem to be particularly prone to stories in which the basic concepts of opportunity cost, marginal analysis, and responsiveness of agents to price incentives are absent. The writing of Frances Cairncross, environinental report& for the Economist, has always been an island of clarity in this murky sea. Green, Inc. now collects together in one place most of the pieces of a coinprehensive econoinicsbased analysis of environlnental policy, written for the general reader. Indeed, one of the strengths of the book is that Cairncross succeeds in presenting economic arguments in such a way that they coine across as derived froin simple ideas of logic and coinmon sense. While I have no illusions about converting environinental ideologues, readers who coine to this book with an open inind almost surely will come away from it with an excellent sense of the powerful policy implications of the economist's approach to environmental probleins.
The book is divided into five sections. "Basic Issues" sets the stage by setting up the basic paradigm that achieving environinental objectives is generally costly in terins of other social objectives so that good policy inust be founded, either explicitly or implicitly, on evaluation of tradeoffs at the margin. This section also contains an overview o f t h e politics of environlnental policy. "Policy Measures" is a primer on the tools of environinental policy, including regulation, economic incentives, and legal liability. "Policies in Action" describes five specific exainples of policy problems, how the economics and politics have interacted in the past, and what conclusions for policy are suggested by economic analysis. "The Role of Industry" discusses the rise in environmental consciousness in the business community, and the growing importance of "green" products and reputations. Finally, "The International Environment" discusses the particular issues that arise when environlnental problelns are tackled in international treaties, including the difficult problems inherent in the interaction between international environinental treaties and trade agreements.
The book is particularly strong in emphasizing a nuinber of issues that often receive inadequate attention. For example, Cairncross devotes an entire chapter to the potential for benefiting both the environment and the econoiny by eliminating public subsidies that distort markets for forestry and agricultural products, water, and energy. She also continually reminds the reader that basic environinental problems of clean air and sanita-
